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                                                                     Subjective Equilibrium of the Farm Household:  





Farm households in developed and developing countries continue to adjust to a wide range of changes, including 
changes in external economic conditions in agricultural and nonagricultural markets, environmental forces that 
influence farm and nonfarm decisions, and social structures and norms, as well as policy. Although forces that affect 
the farm household-firm unit vary widely across countries and regions, the subjective equilibrium theory of the farm 
household provides a unified theoretical framework for analyzing the expected adjustments that farm households 
make in response to change. The subjective equilibrium theory of the farm household therefore provides an 
approach for gaining insights into the response or adjustment of farm household-firm units to policy, by assessing 
the complex interrelationships between the alternative ‘perspectives’ of the household:  production, consumption 
and labor allocation (Nakajima 1986). 
 
This paper takes the view that farms in developed countries are increasingly developing key relationships with 
external labor markets through 1) off-farm employment, 2) employment of hired farm workers, or 3) simultaneous 
hiring in and hiring out of labor. The adoption of labor-saving technologies in the farm production sector and in 
home production has released labor from these forms of work (see Barkley 1990, Gardner 1992, Ahearn et al. 1997).  
Off-farm employment among farm men is common, and women have entered the external labor force in growing 
numbers to the point where today the majority of farm women in the U.S., for example, are employed off-farm 
(Findeis 2002).  Further, off-farm wages for women have increased in real terms.  For these reasons, labor decisions 
are increasingly important for understanding the responses of agricultural households to policy change.  These 
trends have the potential to have significant influences not only on the farm household, but also on the organization 
and profitability of the farm itself.      
 
This paper first reviews subjective equilibrium theory and then examines several new directions for research based 
on ‘modern’ theories of the household-firm unit.  In addition, the paper draws upon data from a recent (2001) survey 
of farm households conducted in the United States. The data are based on 2,661 telephone interviews of farm 
women conducted across the United States in April 2001, by the Women on U.S. Farms Initiative Research Group at 
Penn State in collaboration with researchers at the Economic Research Service (ERS/USDA) and in conjunction 
with the National Agricultural Statistics Service at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (NASS/USDA).     
 
The Subjective Equilibrium of the Farm Household Revisited 
 
Building on the earlier works of Chayanov (1923), Tanaka (1951, in Nakajima 1986), and his own works published 
(in Japanese) in the Journal of Rural Economies, Nakajima (1986) laid out the subjective equilibrium theory of the 
farm household. The theory extends well beyond the theory of the farm production unit where profit maximization is 
assumed, and integrates farm production, household consumption and labor decisions into a joint framework of farm 
household utility maximization.   
 
The theory outlined by Nakajima and others and applied in a large number of empirical studies (see, for example, 
Singh et al. 1986, Hallberg et al. 1991, Caillavet et al. 1994, OECD 2001) is particularly useful for understanding 
farm household-firm unit decisions.  It is widely recognized that farm households today depend on a portfolio of 
different sources of income, including income from the farm as well as income from off-farm wage or salary 
employment, nonfarm businesses (that may or may not be related to the farm), pensions, government transfer 
payments to farms (‘coupled’ and ‘decoupled’), and other forms of passive or nonlabor income, including dividends, 
rent, interest, social transfer payments, and other similar forms of income.  For many farm households, income from 
the farm is only a small portion of total household income, although the accumulation of wealth from the farm may 
yield a long-term economic return that enhances the importance of the farming activity from the household’s 
perspective.  The farm household approach as presented by Nakajima (1986) allows the analysis of decisions made 
across these alternative income sources, with explicit consideration of other issues such as a minimum subsistence 
  1level of income.  The focus is not solely on farm production and issues related to farm profitability, e.g., farm 
efficiency, farm labor productivity, among other related topics.  What is important is the relationship between 




Following OECD (2001), three broad types of farms can be differentiated based on the relationship discussed above: 
1) those farms that possess excess labor hired out for work outside of farming (Type I farms), 2) farms that neither 
hire out nor hire in labor (Type II farms), and 3) farms that hire in labor, since they require labor beyond the labor 
that can be supplied to the farm by the farm household (Type III farms).  Subjective equilibrium theory is applicable 
to each of these scenarios, and the conditions affecting work decisions and income flows under each alternative can 
be outlined. The approach of using labor hiring in and hiring out behaviors as a focus has several advantages, since 
this approach serves to capture whether the farm household-firm unit is self-sufficient in labor or depends on 
conditions in external labor markets.  Further, the overall spatial distribution of farms is likely to be, at least in part, 
a function of the local availability of off-farm employment opportunities and the availability of labor that can be 
hired to work on farms.  From the perspective of changes in farm structure, these appear to be important 
considerations.  
 
Type I farms  
 
Type I farms include several possible organizations of labor resources.  Type I farms can include farm household 
engagement in either off-farm wage or salary employment or in a nonfarm business (self-employment), or both, in 
addition to the farming business.  On Type I farms there is excess household labor not being utilized in the farm 
operation or in the farm household, likely a result in both cases of adoption of labor-saving technologies by the farm 
household-firm unit   
 
On some farms, farm family members work on the farm and yet also operate a nonfarm business, that may or may 
not be farm-related.
1  This case combines two forms of  ‘self-employment’.  Data from the 2001 Penn State Survey 
of U.S. Farm Women show that about 15 percent of all farm households in the U.S. operate at least one nonfarm 
business, a figure that is about the same as the percentage for Canada observed by Bollman (1994).  
 
Graphically, the combination of two forms of self-employment is shown in Figure 1.  Farming (F) initially has the 
highest marginal return to labor, but eventually the marginal return to labor utilized in farming is exceeded by the 
marginal return to labor employed in another business (N).  Equilibrium occurs where the household’s indifference 
curve (Io) is tangent to the combined net returns to labor curve (OZ’N’), i.e., at the point Q.  The optimal amount of 
household work time is T , and the household’s time is allocated to farming T and to the alternative business T .  








t T T − , where T  is the total time endowment of the farm 
household.
2  The different businesses, of which the farm is one, may be operated from the farm household-firm unit 
location.  In the case where the farm and nonfarm business are interrelated, jointness in input-output relationships 
should be accounted for in estimation.  There may be multiple nonfarm businesses being operated by the same 
household.  
 
Alternatively, farm households may engage in farm work and off-farm wage or salary employment, another possible 
combination, as shown in Figure 2.  Given a constant wage rate (shown by the line W in Figure 2) and the farm 
business net returns curve F, the farm household can be expected to allocate time initially to the farm and then to 
off-farm wage employment. The result is multiple job-holding both on and off the farm.  Again, the equilibrium is at 
                                                 
1 The issue of the relationship between a nonfarm business and the farm is often raised, due to potential jointness in 
inputs and outputs.  Some nonfarm businesses are so interrelated with the farm that viewing the two businesses 
separately is neither feasible nor practical.  However, many farm businesses are only minimally related to the farm. 
2 The line S  is the minimum subsistence level of income discussed by Nakajima (1986).  S′
  2  Q and  is allocated to work, with  to farm work and T  to off-farm work.  Off-farm work may serve, in this 
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Figure 2.  Subjective equilibrium with choices between the farm business and off-farm 
wage or salary employment. It is also potentially the case that some families engage in all three possibilities simultaneously, i.e., off-farm 
wage/salary work, work in a nonfarm business, and work on the farm.  In each case, the marginal returns to the work 
that is undertaken influences the time allocation of farm household time, that is also affected by the household’s 
preferences for consumption versus ‘leisure’ or home time.   
 
Finally, Nakajima (1986) also raises the possibility that some farm households may, in fact, work full-time off the 
farm, and lays out the case where off-farm work has a higher initial marginal return to labor than farming (Figure 
3).
3  In this case, farm households allocate time to one (or more) full-time jobs, and then use the remaining work 
time to operate the farm.  The implicit assumption is made that a second off-farm job has lower marginal returns 
than farming. 
 
This case is an important possibility.  Although the presence of full-time off-farm employment does not assure that 
time will be allocated to off-farm work ‘first,’ with farm work ‘second,’ it is quite likely that a number of farms in 
the United States (and possibly in other countries as well) exhibit this behavior.  This matters from a policy 
perspective, especially in light of policy reform under CAP and 1996 FAIR in the U.S. (see OECD 2001). That is, if 
decoupled direct payments are considered a form of exogenous income to the farm household, then the effect of 
payments will be a decrease in total work time, due to the income effect. However, the ‘order of work’ matters.  If 
time is first allocated to the farm operation and then to off-farm work (as is typically assumed, except for small 
farms) then the decrease in total work time will affect the time allocated to off-farm work, with less time being spent 
working off the farm.  But if time is first allocated to the off-farm work and then to the farm, the effects of policy 
reform resulting in decoupled farm payments will be quite different, with the decline in work time affecting the farm 
not the off-farm work. Using the subjective equilibrium theory of the farm household-firm unit, it is possible to 
show that the effects of policy reform will vary, depending on the assumed ‘order of work’. 
 
Type II farms  
 
Type II farms are self-sufficient in labor and neither hire out nor hire in labor.  Work time is entirely allocated to the 
farm operation, with no jobs ‘on the side’.  At least two possibilities exist.  First, on Type II farms, all household 
labor may be used to support the farm because the farm yields higher marginal returns than either a nonfarm 
business or an off-farm job, over the entire range of time allocated to work.  Farming is either quite profitable, or 
off-farm jobs and nonfarm businesses pay particularly low returns to labor, or both.  The choice is to work entirely 
on the farm.   
 
Type II farms where this situation is characteristic may be located either in rural or urban areas.  In some rural areas, 
and particularly in remote rural regions, off-farm jobs may not be locally accessible, resulting in all work time being 
allocated to the farm operation (or to ‘home time’), with likely underemployment of labor resources on the farm.  
The possibility also exists that the local off-farm wage is so low that it fails to exceed the reservation wage, and farm 
household members may choose to allocate time to ‘home time’, when in other labor markets they would work off-
farm.  Finally, the transactions costs associated with working (e.g., the cost of working off the farm including the 
cost of travel to and from off-farm work and the time spent in travel) may also influence work choices.  In remote 
rural regions, transaction costs associated with off-farm work can be high. 
 
Type III farms 
 
Finally, Type III farms are those that hire in labor, i.e., those needing labor beyond that which can be supplied by the 
farm household.  Hired-in labor may be employed year-round or on a seasonal basis when farm labor requirements 
are high.  In either case, the farm household’s preferences are to hire in labor (at a wage Wh) to supplement farm 
household labor.  This possibility is shown in Figure 4,where  is the total labor time (both family and hired) 





                                                 
3 Killingsworth (1983) also discusses the implications of certain labor rationing conditions. 
  4  hired-farm labor ( ).  As shown in Figure 4, household work time that would have been allocated to the farm 
is now ‘freed up’ by the hiring in of farm labor and can be utilized for another purpose, i.e., leisure or home time, or 
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  Figure 4.  Allocation of household work time with the hiring-in of supplemental labor. 
  5Some farms also both hire in and hire out labor (see Findeis and Lass 1992).  Sadoulet et al. (1998) argue that this 
behavior is economically rational and can be attributed to the existence of wage ‘wedges’ that separate the wages of 
family farm managers from those paid for hired farm labor.  This result is that farm household labor may be hired at 
higher wages in the off-farm labor market while lower-wage workers are hired for farm work.  The Penn State 
Survey of U.S. Farm Women shows that this behavior is surprisingly prevalent on U.S. farms, with about 30 percent 
of surveyed households simultaneously hiring in and hiring out labor.
4  
 
Factors Affecting the Subjective Equilibrium 
 
Each farm ‘type’ may be affected by changes in factors expected to influence the subjective equilibrium.  In some 
cases, farm households adjust their intensity of use of household labor or hired farm labor, in response to changes in 
factors known to influence these decisions.  In other cases, farms may ‘switch’ between farm types — for example, 
with farm households that had previously not worked off the farm now taking up off-farm employment (Type II 
farm becomes Type I), or farm households that were previously operating a nonfarm business giving it up in 
response to increases in farm profitability (Type I farm becomes Type II).   
 
Examples of factors expected to influence the subjective equilibrium include changes in farm profitability due to 
increases in product prices, decreases in the prices of factors of production (lower input prices), or changes in policy 
that lead to higher marginal returns to labor allocated to farming; increases in the off-farm wage rate; changes in 
exogenous income (e.g., dividends, rent, interest, government transfer payments unrelated to work effort); and 
changes in nonland assets and land, and other fixed factors of production. Table 1 outlines some of the potential 
changes that likely result in adjustments in work time between different sources of income, and between work and 
leisure.   
 
Changes in policy can be expected to cause labor adjustments, influencing the distribution of farms between the 
three different farm types.  Price supports can be expected to affect work decisions similar to the effects of higher 
product prices, i.e., enhancing the profitability of agriculture.  In the short run at least, more farm household time 
can be expected to be allocated to the farm operation. Alternatively, minimum wage legislation increasing the 
minimum wage paid for nonfarm work can affect the returns to off-farm employment, at least for some workers.  
Finally, (fully) decoupled direct payments are expected to influence the total time worked by the household.  The 
effect on the total household depends on the marginal returns to labor off the farm versus in farming, as previously 




1.  Considering the Effects of Off-farm Work on the Farm Operation 
 
In general, the majority of models presented in the literature have assumed that time allocated to off-farm work has a 
lower marginal return (initially) than farm work (the model in Figure 2).  That is, the time allocated to on-farm 
versus off-farm work is determined by the marginal conditions between on-farm and off-farm work, but work time 
on the farm is assumed to have the highest initial return to labor time.  Both Arayama (1985, 1986) and Nandkeolyar 
(1991) question this approach, arguing that at least some farm households (in Japan and in Pennsylvania) have a 
higher initial marginal return to labor allocation off the farm. The Arayama and Nandkeolyar studies in many 
respects take the approach of Nakajima (1986) that argues that at least some farm households (and perhaps more 
importantly, individuals within these households) allocate time to full-time off-farm work initially and then to farm 
work.  Of course, issues of farmer preferences for on-farm versus off-farm work come into play here, and several 
studies have shown that farm operators generally prefer to work on their own farms in comparison to working in an 
off-farm wage job (see Weiss 1997, Corsi and Findeis 2000). 
 
The result of the view that farming has the higher initial marginal return is that many studies in developed countries  
                                                 
4 The hiring in and hiring out of labor occurred within a year.  It is possible that there is not exact simultaneity, and 
that hiring in and hiring out occurred in different seasons. 
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Product price (farm) 
  Increases in the output price received for farm products can be expected to increase work time allocated to 
the farm, with less time allocated to nonfarm businesses and off-farm wage employment.  Relative effects, 
however, will be influenced by the income effect; increases may negatively influence total work time. 
Factor prices (farm) 
  Increases in prices paid for farm inputs can be expected to result in declines in time allocated to farming, 
with increases in the time allocated to nonfarm businesses and off-farm work. 
Product price (nonfarm business) 
  Increases in the price of nonfarm business products are expected to increase work time allocated to the 
nonfarm business, with the extent of total work time (and therefore the allocation to other forms of work) 
depending on the response to the increase in income.  The response will also depend on whether the 
products produced by the nonfarm business and the farm are interrelated, implying jointness in labor 
decisions. 
Factor prices (nonfarm business) 
  Increases in prices paid for nonfarm business inputs are expected to reduce the time allocated to the 
nonfarm business. 
Land use 
  If farm land area increases, the expectation is an increase in farm production.  The likely effect is an 
increase in the marginal returns to farm work, resulting in more time allocated to farming.  The impacts on 
time allocation will also depend on the income effect. 
Exogenous income 
  Increases in exogenous income (e.g., dividends, interest, rent, and some forms of transfer payments) will 
reduce total work time. 
Off-farm wage 
  Increases in the off-farm (external) wage will ‘pull’ labor off the farm into the off-farm labor market.  The 
expected result is more off-farm work and less self-employment (farm and nonfarm), to the extent that the 
marginal returns to off-farm work exceed the marginal returns to self-employment.  Again, the total work 
time will depend on the extent to which income increases, resulting in changes in leisure. 
Price support policies 
  The effects of farm price supports are similar to changes in product prices.  Price supports enhance product 
prices, with the effects similar to those outlined above for increases in product prices. 
Direct payment policies 
  If direct payments are fully decoupled, direct payments will have the same effect as increases in exogenous 
income. 
 
  7have considered the agricultural household model as a separable one, with farm decisions made first followed by the 
household’s utility maximization problem.  If separability is not assumed a priori, then the very real possibility 
presents itself that off-farm employment can affect the organization of the farm operation.  That is, off-farm 
employment and the organization of the farm enterprise are jointly determined in a nonseparable way, not in the 
recursive or separable way that most have assumed.
5  If this is the case, then it is possible that off-farm employment 
will affect farm efficiency, for example, or influence enterprise choice or environmental decisions, or any number of 
different farm decisions.   
 
Some studies of farm production have included off-farm employment or income as an exogenous variable in the 
models being estimated.  However, these studies have assumed that off-farm choices are exogenous, which is not the 
case in the Nakajima model, regardless of in which ‘order’ the farm work vs. off-farm work occurs.  The correct 
approach is to assume that off-farm and on-farm decisions are endogenous — i.e., both are choice variables.  Thus, 
off-farm work participation, off-farm labor supply and off-farm income should be modeled in such a way as to 
recognize their endogeneity with decisions that affect the farm operation. 
 
The recognition that the subjective equilibrium is more appropriate, particularly for analyzing the effects of policy 
reform, should encourage new research that considers off-farm and nonfarm business decisions as endogeneous, 
with potential implications for the farm organization. 
 
2.  Disentangling the Household: The Relevance of Disaggregated Data 
 
Many countries continue to focus their survey efforts on the farm or the farm operator, without consideration of the 
entire household.  Farm surveys that focus on the farm itself and on the responses of one main farm operator have 
two principal weaknesses.  First, such data provide only a partial assessment of the income position of the farm 
household, and likely miss the other work that takes place within the household that may generate significant 
income support.  And second, this approach fails to include the important interrelationships that might exist between 
alternative sources of income — i.e., assuming that the farm and nonfarm enterprises are separable may ignore 
important interactions, such as the use of income from off-farm employment for farm investment or to secure farm 
loans, or the use of farm losses to offset taxes owed by another business operated by the household. 
 
Many studies today explicitly consider differences in behavior by adult males and females within the household and 
may even consider the work contributions of children separately (often disaggregated by gender).  In developed 
countries, estimated models have generally used a disaggregation of data by the farm husband and wife, or perhaps 
by farm operator and farm spouse (roughly assumed to be nearly the same as the husband/wife model) (see, for 
example, Lass et al. 1989, Huffman and Lange 1989, Tokle and Huffman 1991, Huffman 1991, Bryden et al. 1992,  
Lass and Gempesaw 1992, Corsi and Findeis 2000). The explicit consideration of children is more likely to be 
observed in models of agricultural households in developing countries, in part due to the importance of child labor to 
developing country farm households and due to interest in schooling-work trade-offs (see Becker 1981, Behrman et 
al. 1993, Mukhopadhyay 1994).  
 
Disaggregation of the adjustment effects by gender in the household serves to provide a better understanding of the 
effects of economic and social change and the impacts of policy (Schultz 1999). Consideration of the multiple 
activities of individuals that comprise the household unit allows not only ways to explain time allocation differences 
across individuals but also (importantly) allows the explicit consideration of the multiple income sources that serve 
to support the farm household-firm unit.  
 
An empirical example:  farm women in the United States 
 
Data from the Penn State Survey of U.S. Farm Women support the view that there are important changes occurring 
in farm households, particularly with respect to the work roles of farm women.  For example, in 1980 when 
                                                 
5 There are really two different but interrelated issues here:  1) separability versus nonseparability, and 2) the ‘order 
of work’ choices, even when work decisions are jointly made based on the marginal conditions. 
  8  Rosenfeld (1985) conducted the last major survey of farm women in the United States, 37 percent of farm women 
had worked at an off-farm wage or salary job.  In the 2001 survey, 52 percent of all farm women had worked at an 
off-farm job in the previous year and 62 percent of working-age women had done so.
6 
 
The changes in participation in off-farm work among women on U.S. farms are significant.  Further, the off-farm 
income contributions of women have increased, due to both higher participation rates of farm women in external 
labor markets and to the higher real wages earned by women today.  Many farm women in the United States now 
hold jobs that supply them with employee benefits, that benefit the farm household in both the short term (health 
benefits) and long term (pension or retirement benefits).  The Penn State survey found that 59.7 percent of farm 
women that worked off-farm received health insurance through their employers, 52.8 percent received life 
insurance, and 55.4 percent received a pension as a benefit of their employment in an off-farm job.  When asked 
why they worked off-farm, over half of the farm women noted that receiving benefits was an important reason for 
their off-farm work; i.e., those receiving job benefits reported viewing benefit receipt as a very important reason for 
their work. 
 
The 2001 survey also shows that farm women have different views of their roles on the farm than is often assumed 
by data collection efforts and research focused at the household level.  When asked if they are ‘the main operator or 
one of the main operators of the farm or ranch’, 53 percent of the farm women participating in the 2001 survey 
responded ‘yes’. In total, about half of all women who participated in the survey self-classified themselves into a 
‘high involvement’ role on the farm — as a principal farm operator (10 percent), full agricultural partner (31 
percent), or farm business manager (7 percent). Further, women’s roles in farm decision-making appear to be 
changing, with more women now participating in making decisions (either alone or jointly) regarding purchases of 
major farm equipment, what products to produce and the use of new innovative technologies on the farm, and how 
farm products are marketed.  Interrelationships between the farm and off-farm work decisions can also can be 
observed: about one in three farm women in the United States reported that working to provide money for the farm 
operation is an important reason that they have off-farm work.          
 
The ‘disentangling’ of trends affecting individuals within households has potential for providing a better 
understanding of intrahousehold adjustments.  For example, policy reform may differentially affect farm men and 
women, due to gender differences in marginal productivities, the ‘order of work’, and reservation wages.  
 
Alternative theories: cooperative versus noncooperative bargaining models 
 
Related to the recognition that intrahousehold interactions are potentially important, at least two bodies of literature 
are developing, to enhance knowledge of farm household behavior and the interrelationships between individuals 
comprising the farm household-firm unit.  Both bodies of literature use game theory to further ‘disentangle’ 
household relationships.  They include:  1) the application of bargaining models to assess the interactions 
(‘bargaining’) between men and women in the farm household, and 2) the use of bargaining models applied to the 
issue of intergenerational relationships and transfer of the farm.  Recent advances have not only focused on 
disaggregating household data but also on understanding how differences in preferences affect the decisions that are 
made within the household — i.e., how the subjective equilibrium changes when different assumptions about 
household behavior are made.  
 
In the early 1980s, Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) questioned the unified household 
model approach found in much of the literature, and proposed models based on bargaining behavior.  The unified 
model of households assumes that the household acts as a single decision-making unit, maximizing the utility of the 
entire household unit.  An aggregate household utility function is assumed.  Income earned by individual household 
members is pooled, and the household unit makes decisions jointly — for factor demand, labor supply, consumption 
levels, and all other production-consumption decision made by the household unit.  The unified model moves away 
from the even earlier ‘benevolent household head’ model by assuming that all individuals in the household are 
involved in joint decision-making.  The initial bargaining models assumed that individuals in the household possess 
                                                 
6 Working-age is defined as including those 18 through 64 years of age, inclusive. 
  9their own preferences that might differ.  Therefore, the household’s decisions might reflect a bargaining process 
between individual household members.   
 
The early bargaining models posited that individuals in households likely make decisions over some aspects of the 
household alone but make others jointly as a unit, with their ‘say’ being influenced by those factors that affect their 
threat points and bargaining power.  Consumption goods were believed to have two components:  a set of ‘public 
goods’ that are decided upon by the household jointly using pooled resources and a set of ‘private goods’ that are 
decided upon by the individuals themselves.  Each individual is assumed to decide on his or her own leisure time.  
Decisions were assumed to take place in a Nash-bargained household decision framework, with each individual’s 
threat point being the utility gained by the individual if they left the household (McElroy 1990).  The model includes 
both shared and nonshared components (see Lundberg et al. 1997). 
 
This model, now known as the cooperative bargaining model, has received considerable attention in the literature 
and has been applied in a number of contexts to understand the decisions that households make.  The differentiation 
of ‘spheres’ between men and women in the household has been argued by some (e.g., Lundburg and Pollak 1993), 
as a way in which the model plays out within the household when agreement cannot be reached.  As a result, the 
public goods provided within the household may well have gender and age-differentiated characteristics, that reflect 
gender and age roles.  Further, there is likely to be a dynamic aspect to the decisions — with decisions made in an 
initial time period affecting future decisions (Ott 1995, in Doss 1996).  In the cooperative model, factors that 
influence the threat point also influence the decisions made within the household.  Therefore, as individuals within 
the household are faced with the possibilities of contributing more income or additional assets to the household, the 
implication is a change in the threat point.  Changes in the threat point are expected to influence the allocation of 
resources within the household as well as work choices.  
 
Some recent studies have taken a different approach, i.e., the noncooperative bargaining model approach.  The 
noncooperative models are based on the key assumption that income is not pooled in the household and that 
individuals make decisions based on their own individual preferences and their individual access to resources.  The 
bargaining that occurs in this model determines the allocation of resources to both the private and public goods of 
the household (Doss 1996). The model is believed to be most applicable to households (e.g., polygamous 
households) where income is not pooled — the male household head allocates his income and the wives each 
maintain their own incomes to use for their individual households.  The noncooperative model diverges to a greater 
extent from the unified model than the cooperative bargaining model, since each individual is assumed to maximize 
his or her own utility, based on his or her own preferences.     
 
Empirical applications to farm households 
 
The models described above have been applied in the economics literature, and have received considerable attention 
in the literature on agricultural households in developing countries.  However, there have been few studies of 
bargaining by men and women in farm households in developed countries.  Findeis and Swaminathan (2002) suggest 
that farm decision-making is influenced by gender differences in bargaining power that are a function of the line of 
succession of the farm through his or her family.  His or her human capital appear to be less important in farm 
decision-making, although human capital variables strongly influence work choices on versus off the farm. 
 
Lundberg and Ward-Batts (2002) argue that household outcomes can be in part explained by consideration of the 
household as an entire unit, but that the power of models improve as differences by gender are considered, and have 
the potential to improve even further as intrahousehold bargaining relationships are analyzed.  It is in this line of 
thought that the bargaining models fit — if household power positions can be better explained both theoretically and 
then empirically, the ability to ‘predict’ outcomes will likely improve. 
 
Bargaining can also be applied to the problem of intergenerational transfers, i.e., from parents to succeeding 
generations (see Rangel 2000).  For farm families, either inheriting or purchasing the farm from a family member is 
an important issue; the majority of farms participating in the Penn State Survey of U.S. Farm Women were passed 
down to succeeding generations either through purchase from a relative or gifting.  From a policy perspective, the 
  10  conditions under which farms pass from one generation to the next is a key concern, given the potential effects of 
inheritance taxation on farm households and farms.    
 
Research has recently focused on the issue of intergenerational succession in agricultural households (see, for 
example, Kimhi 1994, Phimister 1994, Pesquin et al. 1999, Kimhi and Nachlieli 2001).  In the bargaining models, 
parents are viewed as offering rights to the farm to their children in return for old-age security (through continuing 
to live on the farm with the aid of their children).  Children are then viewed as receiving productive farm assets in 
return for providing for their parents.  Typically, both parents and children live on the farm as adults, during the 
period of ‘transfer’.  More research using such approaches have merit in terms of understanding the process of farm 
transfer.  Given the aging of the farm population, this issue probably deserves even more research attention. 
       
3.  The New Behavioral Economics 
 
Finally, a potentially important field of study related to the subjective equilibrium theory outlined by Nakajima 
(1986) is the New Behavioral Economics, an approach that combines thought from economics, sociology and 
anthropology (see discussion in Mullainathan and Thaler 2000). When analyzing household behaviors and decision-
making, economic incentives are often shown to be important but may fall short of fully explaining the full range of 
outcomes that are of interest, either from a research or policy perspective.  
 
At this point, this approach has not become integrated into the household model, although research on agricultural 
households has in general implicitly considered the possible contributions of both sociology and anthropology to the 
understanding of household behaviors.  A better integration of the theories and empirical findings of these three 
disciplines would further enhance understanding of the subjective equilibrium as it plays out in households engaged 




The subjective equilibrium theory of the farm household-firm unit has provided a unified framework that has served 
to explain the many changes that have occurred in the farm sector and on farms in both developing and developed 
countries.  Relatively few farm household-firm units in developed countries today are independent of external labor 
markets that can influence the returns to farm household labor allocated to employment outside of farming and the 
costs of hiring labor for farm work. Instead, most farm households are engaged in multiple job-holding and/or dual 
job-holding, and depend on both farm and nonfarm income. Given the trend toward more dependence on off-farm 
employment and income even among farm households that operate large and medium-size farms, this trend has 
implications for a wide range of farms and is no longer limited to small farms.     
 
New approaches to understanding differences that occur within households and the dynamics of household 
interactions are receiving increased attention.  Research has sought to disaggregate or >disentangle= the farm 
household, and recent studies have attempted to use bargaining models to extend this understanding to household 
decisions that cannot be fully explained outside of a game theoretic framework. Understanding how farm 
households are affected by and respond to policy reform is likely to be best understood when the multiple 
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